Compensation for Unfair Remand in Polish Penal Law

La prescrizione penale

(di Adrian Szumski[i])

The remand is one of the most important preventive measures which exist in Polish legal system and plays significant role in penal law, enabling proper running of the criminal procedure. It may awake some controversies, however. On the one hand, it is an instrument characterized by big effectiveness: making an accused isolated, placing him in jail, it gives the best guarantee that a person will not hinder the penal proceedings (but at least her or his capacities in this scope will be seriously limited). On the other hand, it causes severe consequences for the accused person such as restricting their freedom, separation from their family or even some complications connected with their employment. Imprisonment may also have a negative influence on the mental health of the accused person.

The above-mentioned ‘by-products’ of the remand are not so important if an accused, in result of a trial, is sentenced (according to the Polish Penal Procedure Code the period of the remand is included to the sentence). A problem arises, however, if an individual is acquitted and the remand was obviously unfair.

Discussing legal foundations of compensation for an unfair remand in Polish penal law one should notice that the regulations involved are based on both international law and Polish domestic law. As for regulations of the international law, the right to claim compensation for unfair remand include, above all, following regulations:

• Article 5 (5) of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that ‘Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation’;
• Article 9 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights according to which ‘Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation’;
• Article 3 of the Protocol No.7 to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘When a person has, by a final decision, been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed, or he has been pardoned, on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to the law or the practice of the State concerned, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him’);
• Article 14 (6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him’).

Among Polish legal acts, in turn, regulations concerning the compensation for an unfair remand include, above all the Polish Constitution. This concerns particularly its two regulations:

• Article 77 (1) which states that ‘Everyone shall have right to compensation for damage which has been caused to him by unlawful action of state’s organ’;
• Article 41 (5) which states that ‘Everyone who has been unlawfully deprived of freedom shall have right to compensation’.

Moreover, matters connected with compensation are included in the Chapter 58 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code which regulates procedure in cases when an individual claims compensation.

The above mentioned regulations of international law are very general, and first of all they express the idea of compensation for unlawful remand. They give some impulses to individual countries in order to introduce proper regulations in their internal legal systems.

As for the meaning of Polish regulations, one should notice that the Polish Constitution (namely Articles 77 (1) and 41 (5)) defines first of all who is entitled to a compensation, stating that it is ‘everyone’. It means that every individual is entitled to it, not only Polish citizens but also foreigners and stateless people. Simultaneously, one should add that the Polish Constitution does not define the sole notion of damage. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has presented various opinions on this subject: originally it claimed that the notion ‘damage’ in Polish penal law is the same as in Polish civil law[ii] (which meant that unlawfully imprisoned individual has a right to damages in full scope). Later however, the Tribunal changed its mind claiming that the Article 77 (1) cannot be considered as a basis for full compensation in case of every occurrence which causes damage.[iii] In contrast, in Polish doctrine of law predominates the civilistic interpretation of the Article 77 (1), which means that this regulation concerns both financial and non-financial damages.

The consequence of such an approach (which is correct in author’s opinion), is that the claim mentioned in the Chapter 58 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code should be recognized as a civil claim which may be demanded within penal procedure, however. The liability of the State’s Treasure is based here on the principle of risk because it is the state’s duty to ensure justice and so, there is no justification for encumbering the offended person with a mistake of the administration of justice.[iv]

Taking the rule of risk as a basis for compensation results also from the analysis of both the Polish Civil Code and the Polish Penal Procedure Code. The content of the former shows that as often as a legislator has expressed the principle of guilt in a content of the Polish Civil code – he has expressed it explicitly. On the contrary, the Article 552 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code does not contain such an explicit ascertainment, which leads to a conclusion that the liability of the State’s Treasure in Polish penal law is based on the principle of risk. One should notice, however, that state’s liability in Polish penal law differs from that in Polish civil law in some respect. The differences concern mainly differently formulated conditions of granting compensation, but also the scope of subjects entitled to claiming compensation, deadlines for claiming compensation as well as procedural matters.[v]

         The Polish Penal Procedure Code defines who is entitled to claim compensation for an unarguably unfair remand. They are:

• the arrested person;
• in a situation when the arrested person was died – a person who, in a result of unarguably unfair remand, has lost:
• the livelihood claimable from entitled person, according to the law;
• the livelihood constantly provided to this person by the deceased, provided that equity considerations enforce granting the compensation.

Individuals who claim compensation after the death of the accused should do that during the period included in the Article 555 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code or within one year after the death of the accused.

            When discussing the basis of State’s Treasure liability in the light of the Chapter 58 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code, one must ascertain that the Code provides the following conditions of such a liability:

• existence of binding judgment which finished an action in the particular case where remand was applied;
• unarguably unfair imprisonment by applying remand;
• damage suffered by the accused, caused by remand;
• existence of proximate cause between remand and ensuing damage.

As for the first of these conditions, one should consider, above all, if all binding judgments might be a basis for claiming compensation. The Code provides here that ‘The accused who in a result of renewal of action, or due to cassation has been acquitted or sentenced to lower punishment, should be entitled to compensation from the State’s Treasure for suffered damage, as well as satisfaction for suffered harm, arisen from executing in regard to him, completely or partly, the punishment which he shouldn’t suffer from’ (Article 552 §1 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code). The quoted regulation shall also be applied if, after the abrogation of a judgment, an action was discontinued as a result of circumstances that had not been taken into consideration in the previous action (Article 552 §2 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code).

In the light of above-mentioned regulations there is no doubt that judgment of acquittal may be the basis for claiming compensation. One should stress however that the fact that judgment of acquittal had been passed does not release the court from a duty to examine if a remand was not unarguably unfair. Thus, it is the court’s task to evaluate constantly the application of this preventive mean. The circumstances established in particular case might be then a basis for appreciation that the remand had not been unarguably unfair, despite of the acquittal. Such a situation would arise when the accused hides or persistently does not turn up for subpoena.[vi]

Besides the acquittal, it is also clear that it is admissible to claim a compensation when a court passes a sentence of depletion.

In case of convicting sentences, as well as sentences in which the court waived the administration of punishment and sentences which conditionally discontinue the proceedings, the situation is different however.

As for convicting sentences there is a specific ‘compensation’, namely the inclusion the remand to the period of sentence. Such an inclusion admittedly makes it impossible to claim compensation for an unarguably unfair remand, but it does not include the possibility of claiming compensation for damage according to the Article 552 §1 and 2 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code (provided the conditions included in these regulations are filled). One should remember, however, that the above-mentioned regulation does not solve completely the discussed problem. There might arise a situation that the period of remand (because of its length) cannot be fully included to the period of sentence. Admittedly, in such circumstances the remand might be recognized as unfair because of the fact of convicting sentence, however, one must notice that the compensation would be justified (even in the case of convicting judgment) if a remand had been applied with the violation of the Articles 249 and 258 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code.[vii]

There is a similar situation with sentences in which the court waived the administration of punishment and sentences which conditionally discontinued the proceedings. Obviously in such situations there is no possibility to include the remand to the period of sentence. It is possible however to claim compensation when there was a violation of the Articles 249 and 258 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code.

When discussing the condition of binding judgment it is worth adding that there have aroused proposals in Poland to enable claiming a compensation not only for an unfair remand but also for unfairly brought charges. Such a proposal was presented in 2010 at the conference organized by The Penal Law Commission of Codification. This idea deserves attention because one must notice that even when a remand has not been applied, the individual might experience negative consequences of the trial. They could be severe especially to those who work in business; in such cases bringing charges, even without the application of a remand in the future, may cause a person to go bankrupt. An additional advantage of the Commission’s proposal is that it would force the prosecutor to examine a particular case better before bringing charges.[viii]

Another substantive premise of State’s Treasure liability is the imprisonment of the accused, provided that such an imprisonment was ‘unarguably unfair’, as stated in the Polish Penal Procedure Code. Here arises a problem of the relationship between two phrases: ‘unlawful’ (used in the Article 77 (1) of the Polish Constitution) and ‘unarguably unfair’ (included in the Article 552 §4 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code). One may observe here three areas concerning the actions which cause damage. First of them are actions unlawful and unarguably unfair. The second group, however, are actions that were admittedly lawful but (in a result of later proceedings) turned up to be unarguably unfair. Finally, the third category are actions admittedly unlawful but fair. The last of these categories is the most controversial. As an example of such a situation one may give a case when the conditions of applying the remand had been fulfilled but the remand was applied by improper court (for example by regional court instead of district court).[ix]

Talking about the details one should take note that remand would be unfair in two cases:

• if it was applied with violation of provisions of the Penal Procedure Code

or

• if a remand turned up to be not proper, taking into consideration the final binding sentence.

As for the violation of provisions of the Penal Procedure Code, first of all it is necessary to examine whether the remand should have been applied at all. The examination should be performed here taking into consideration the circumstances that existed at the moment of applying the remand. When it turns out that the decision concerning the remand violated the Chapter 28 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code, the further proceeding would not be relevant for examination whether application of remand was justified.[x]

Other situations connected with the violation of regulations of the Penal Procedure Code are as follows:

• application of remand based on forcing the accused to plead guilty[xi];
• the line of defense of the accused, when he claims the right of self-defense, provided that rejection of his right of self-defense results only form the subjective recognition of the organ which leads the proceeding[xii];
• application of remand as a result of mistakes made by the organ which leads the proceeding, indicating the organ’s bias, regardless of the fact if these mistakes were known to the court in the moment of application of remand and regardless of the fact if conditions of performing the remand dropped out[xiii].

As for the invalidity of applying the remand in the context of final sentence, it is a matter of examination if such a necessity exists, taking into consideration the overall case. As it was said before, it depends on the type of judgment.

         The third condition of State’s Treasure liability is a damage caused by the remand, suffered by the accused. Discussing this issue first of all one should notice that Polish penal procedure does not define the term ‘damage’. In this situation one might refer to the Article 361 §2 of the Polish Civil Code that states that ‘(…) undoing damage includes undoing losses made by the injured party as well as profits it could gain if damage would not have been caused to them’.[xiv]

         When it comes to the losses made by accused, they would be a result of a bodily injury or disorder of health, above all. According to the Article 444 §1 of the Polish Civil Code, undoing damage would include here all the costs resulting from damage.

In contrast, as for the compensation for lost profits the key issue would be the compensation of earnings, lost in result of remand. The compensation for damage caused by execution of punishment or by remand includes also costs of advocacy made by the injured party during the proceeding. It does not include, however, neither the value of parcels sent by the members of family nor the costs of fare to the prison made by them, since these costs are not a detriment to the injured party’s assets.[xv]

One should remember that a complete enumeration of elements which the compensation includes, in regard to lost profits, is impossible, but it is worth mentioning that the loss of profits may also be a result of losing possibilities of finding a job or a higher post.[xvi]

From the practical point of view it is worth emphasising that unfair imprisoned people in Poland are more and more aware of their rights and they claim compensation for an unfair remand more often than some years ago. What is more, the courts very often regard these claims as justified. In so far, as at the end of 90’s the number of people whose claims were deemed valid was very low, in contrast, at the beginning of the present century there appeared a significant increase in such cases.

The table No 1 shows the number of individuals to whom the compensation for unfair remand or detention has been granted, and the total sum of compensations that has been granted in the period 1999 – 2012.

Table No 1. The number of individuals, to whom the compensation for unfair remand or detention has been granted, and the total sum of compensations that has been granted in the period of 1999 – 2012. (Source: Polish Ministry of Justice)

In contrast to the compensation for material losses, estimating the compensation for non-material injury caused by all unfair remand is more difficult. As, the moral injury is not a value which could be assessed strictly by a sum of money, but it is a result of negative experiences caused by indignity, connected with the imprisonment and with other afflictions which the injured party might feel.[xvii] The compensation for moral injury has also a symbolic meaning, being (at least partially) a compensation for specific stigmatizing of the accused which is always present in a situation of their imprisonment. Thus, the compensation concerns mainly the liquidation of afflictions in the moral sphere.

When it comes to the way of establishing the amount of compensation for personal injury, it has been stressed in a literature that following circumstances should be here taken into account:

• the length of an imprisonment, caused by remand;
• the way of performing the remand;
• the personal features of the injured party as well as its situation after being released.[xviii] The phrase ‘situation after being released’ shall include however also the negative influence of remand on injured party’s reputation, and also the negative mental experiences connected with imprisonment as well as immaterial losses of the imprisoned individual.

As for the number of individuals to whom the compensation for personal injury has been granted one should ascertain that this number is similar to the number of granted compensations for material losses. It concerns both people who got compensation for an unfair remand and for detention. The data for the period 2009 – 2012 are shown in table No 2.

Years

Number of individuals

Total sum of compensations [PLN]20091002381553201022951291362011312927632420122868998131

Table No 2. The amount of individuals, to whom the compensation for personal injury has been granted and the total sum of compensations that has been granted in the period of 1999 – 2012. (Source: Polish Ministry of Justice)

The last condition of State’s Treasure liability is the causal relation between remand and ensuing damage. The Polish Penal Procedure Code does not define the term ‘causal relation’, so it is helpful here to make use of the regulations of the Polish Civil Code which concern this issue. The key role is played here by the Article 361 §1 of the Polish Civil Code which proclaims the theory of adequate liability and states that ‘A person obliged to paying compensation is responsible only for normal results of actions or non-actions from which the damage has been resulted’. It means that the court which decides about granting the compensation for an unfair remand should adjudicate if the damage that has occurred was a natural consequence of the imprisonment. One should remember, however, that the notion ‘natural consequence’ is vague, and when using this term it is necessary to confront the examined case with similar cases.[xix]

Besides the above described positive conditions, the Polish Penal Procedure Code includes also negative conditions that exclude the State’s Treasure liability. For, the Article 553 §1 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code states that ‘The claim for compensation or for compensation for personal injury cannot be granted to a person who, having an intention to mislead the court or law enforcement agency, had submitted a false notification on committing crime or false testimony, and so caused negative for him verdict as for conviction, remand, applying a preventive measure or detention’. As it arises from above quoted article, an action of the accused in such a situation must have features of intentionally misleading the court or law enforcement agency, however, it can be both a direct intent and recklessness. Thus, it comes here to the situation when a person who submits false notification on committing crime or false testimony, wants a penal proceedings against them to be launched or at least anticipates such a possibility and accepts it.[xx]

According to the Polish Penal Procedure Code it is also allowed to apply respectively the Article 362 §1 of the Polish Civil Code, if the accused contributes to a court’s verdict which is negative for him (see the Article 553 §3 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code).

It is worth remarking that also in the opinion of the Polish High Court the above described improper behavior of the accused should be taken into consideration. This is an indication of the Polish High Court’s resolution from 18 October 1983 in which the Polish High Court confirmed that in case when a person who claimed compensation had contributed (for example by concealing important circumstances of a case) to an unfair condemnation or remand, this fact shall have an influence on the rate of granted compensation for personal injury (in negative, for the proposer, way).[xxi]

Also in the resolution of 7 judges from 16 June 1977 the Polish High Court acknowledged that confession of the accused in purpose of misleading judicial bodies excludes fully the possibility of claiming compensation for unfair condemnation or unfair remand.[xxii]

The negative conditions enumerated in the Article 553 §1 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code do not include however the following situations:

• when a statement was made by a person in conditions defined in the Article 171 §3, 4 and 6 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code. It concerns following cases:
• when specific conditions concerned the hearing of a person under the age of 15 years were not obeyed (the legal actions in which such a person participates should be conducted, if it is possible, in a presence of its statutory representative or real guardian, unless the interest of court proceedings prevents it);
• when leading question were formulated, during a hearing;
• when an organ who conducts the hearing did not disallow leading question or unimportant question;
• when a damage or personal injury occurred as a result of exceeding official authority or negligence of public servant.

When discussing the issues connected with the essence of the claim, one should also mention the recourse claim which inheres to the State’s Treasure. According to the Article 557 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code when the damage has been recovered or a compensation for personal injury has been granted, the State’s Treasure may claim recourse from those who, by their unlawful action, had caused an unfair conviction, remand or detention or imposing a preventive measure. The action which concerns such claims can be brought, in civil proceeding, by the prosecutor or by the organ empowered to represent the State’s Treasure. One should stress, however, that the above mentioned regulation not only states the unlawful action, but also an unlawful inactivity (for example no revocation of remand) can be a basis for claim. The State’s Treasure would have a right to claim the recourse only if the damage has been recovered, it is, when the claim was paid. The recourse has a civilistic character and may be claimed only within civil procedure. The subjects who are eligible for claiming recourse are: the prosecutor and the organ which is created to represent the State’s Treasure.[xxiii]

At the end of above considerations a little attention should be paid to the procedural issues concerned the compensation for an unarguably unfair remand. The essential condition that should be fulfilled in order to be granted a compensation is submitting an application by the entitled person, which means that the principle of accusatorial procedure would be here in effect. Taking into account the fact that this subject would act here as a proposer and not as an accused, their participation in a trial would be not necessary, provided he was correctly informed about the date of a trial. However, in case when a proposer would justify his absence and express his willingness to take part in a trial by proposing a trial’s postponement, the court would be obliged to postpone the trial.[xxiv]

The Article 554 §1 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code states that the compensation notion shall be submitted to the district court whose jurisdiction includes the area where an arrested person was released. The judicature represents the view that it shall be a court in district where the decision that revoked a remand has been undertaken.[xxv] On the contrary, when a preventive measure has been revoked by the Polish High Court the claim of compensation shall be submitted to the district court in district where a person was in fact released.[xxvi]

When it comes to composition of the court, the district court in such cases is represented by 3 judges (Article 554 §1 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code).

The proceeding concerned the compensation may end either by adjudging the compensation or by dismissal the submission. An appeal may be brought according to general rules of Polish penal procedure.

The proceeding is free of costs which means that the proposer pays no costs, regardless of the results of proceeding. A person who claims compensation or compensation for moral injury cannot, however, claim the reimbursement of the costs connected with appointment of the counsel. Such an regulation is unarguably controversial, especially taking into account the innocence presumption rule, since one should remember that the proposer would claim here the compensation (or compensation for moral injury) for ‘unarguably unfair’ action, in result of which they were unfairly imprisoned, bearing by the way moral (and often also financial) losses that were mentioned above. Thus, when exerting their rights, they should have maximal possibilities of claiming compensation without being unnecessary charged with its costs. Taking into consideration the rules of social justice it seems that the proposer should be also exempted from the costs of the appointment of the counsel.[xxvii]

The rules of law also clearly define the time within which claiming the compensation is possible. For, according to the Article 555 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code, the claim for compensation expires after a year from the date of coming into force of the judgment which ends a particular proceeding. The date included in this article has a civil law character and applying with claim after its expiry would lead to rejecting the claim only if the prosecutor asserts statute of limitations, and provided that asserting statute of limitations would not be considered as contrary to the principles of community life.[xxviii] Therefore it is assumed that (when the prosecutor would assert statute of limitations and the court would ascertain that reneging the date by proposer is not justified by any exceptional circumstances) the claim for compensation would be here rejected. Simultaneously, there predominates an opinion that the lack of informing the proposer about the date and the procedure of claiming for compensation cannot be a reason of rejecting the submission only as a result of applying the rule ignorantia iuris nocet, if the judicial body (in the letter to the proposer) has instructed the proposer incorrectly or has given information that could cause an incorrect belief of the proposer, as for the date of submission. This circumstance shall be considered for examining whether it does not justify the infringement, and whether it does not demand not taking into account the statute of limitations according to the Article 5 of the Polish Civil Code.[xxix]

Concluding all the above mentioned considerations concerning the compensation for an unfair remand, one should ascertain that the compensation plays an important role in the Polish penal procedure, especially from the point of view of the presumption of innocence rule. The decree about the remand is set by a judge who is only a human and who is not infallible. Admittedly, the existence of regulations that provide indemnity cannot eliminate wrong decisions about imposing preventive measures, but it enables the innocent person to get compensation, including also compensation for moral injury, which is especially important taking into account the presumption of innocence rule. For, granting the compensation is also (besides of acquittal) a strong signal which denotes of innocence of the accused, and enables to neutralize (in some scope) a peculiar ‘stigmatization’ of the accused, caused by the imprisonment.

Note

[i] Adrian Szumski Ph.D.

University of Wrocław Institute of International Studies

[ii] Validation to the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 4 December 2001.

[iii] Validation to the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 23 September 2003.

[iv] Marian Cieślak, ‘Podstawy odszkodowania za oczywiście niesłuszne tymczasowe aresztowanie’ [1987] 9 Palestra 90; Stanisław Stachowiak, ‘Odszkodowanie za niesłuszne skazanie, tymczasowe aresztowanie lub zatrzymanie w kodeksie postępowania karnego’ [1999] 1 Prokuratura i Prawo 61.

[v] Stanisław Pikulski and Krystyna Szczechowicz, Zatrzymanie i tymczasowe aresztowanie w świetle praw i wolności obywatelskich (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego 2004) 106. The view that liability of the State’s Treasure is based on the principle of risk expressed also the Polish High Court, which concluded that ‘The liability of the State’s Treasure on grounds of unarguably unfair remand (the Article 552 §4 of the Polish Penal Procedure Code) is based on the principle of risk’, see the resolution of the Polish High Court from 15 September 1999.

[vi] Pikulski and Szczechowicz (n 4) 108.

[vii] Andrzej Bulsiewicz and Piotr Hofmański, ‘Materialnoprawne warunki odpowiedzialności Skarbu Państwa za szkodę spowodowaną oczywiście niesłusznym tymczasowym aresztowaniem’ [1981] 10-12 Palestra 40.

[viii] Marek Domagalski ‘Czy będą odszkodowania za niesłuszne oskarżenie?’[2010] http://www.rp.pl/artykul/212825,458311_Odszkodowania__za_niesluszne_oskarzenie_.html.> accessed 23 May 2014.

[ix] Katarzyna Ścisłowicz, ‘Konstytucyjne aspekty odszkodowania za niesłuszne skazanie, tymczasowe aresztowanie lub zatrzymanie’ in Piotr Hofmański (ed), Węzłowe problemy procesu karnego (Wolters Kluwer Business 2010 ) 499.

[x] Pikulski and Szczechowicz (n 4) 107.

[xi] See the resolution of the Polish High Court from 5 March 1981.

[xii] See the resolution of the Polish High Court from 19 July 1989.

[xiii] See the resolution of the Polish High Court from 4 November 2004.

[xiv] See also Agnieszka Sinkiewicz, ‘Pojęcie i rodzaje szkody w polskim prawie cywilnym’ [1998] 2 Rejent 59.

[xv] See the resolution of the Polish High Court from 8 June 1968.

[xvi] Andrzej Bulsiewicz, ‘Ustalenie podstawy i wysokości odszkodowania za niesłuszne skazanie lub oczywiście bezzasadne tymczasowe aresztowanie’ [1967] 23 Zeszyty Naukowe UMK w Toruniu 101.

[xvii] Jan Waszczyński, Odszkodowanie za niesłuszne skazanie i bezzasadne aresztowanie w polskim procesie karnym (Wydawnictwa Prawnicze 1967) 95.

[xviii] Bulsewicz and Hofmański (n 6) 47.

[xix] Bulsewicz and Hofmański (n 6) 49; Andrzej Koch, Związek przyczynowy jako podstawa odpowiedzialności w prawie cywilnym (Państwowe Wydawnictwa Naukowe 1976), Warszawa 1976 131.

[xx] Pikulski and Szczechowicz (n 4) 110.

[xxi] See the resolution of the Polish High Court from 18 October 1983.

[xxii] See Henryk Kubicki, ‘Niektóre problemy odszkodowania za niesłuszne tymczasowe aresztowanie (na tle orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższego)’ [1985] 11 Problemy Praworządności 23.

[xxiii] Pikulski and Szczechowicz (n 4) 111.

[xxiv] Pikulski and Szczechowicz (n 4) 121; see also resolution of the Polish High Court from 14 May 1982.

[xxv] See: resolution of the Polish High Court from 11 November 1972.

[xxvi] See: resolution of 7 judges of the Polish High Court from 24 October 1985.

[xxvii] The opinions which criticize the duty of paying the costs connected with appointment the counsel are being often and often emphasized among the representatives of Polish penal law doctrine, just because of existing conflict with the rules of social justice; see: Tomasz Grzegorczyk, Kodeks postępowania karnego oraz ustawa o świadku koronnym. Komentarz (Wolters Kluwer Business 2008) 1175.

[xxviii] See: resolution of 7 judges of the Polish High Court from 19 February 1997; the decree of the Polish High Court from 5 September 1995.

[xxix] Grzegorczyk (n 26) 1178.